Cybersecurity

Ransomware-as-a-Service: The Industrialization of Cybercrime

Colonial Pipeline, JBS and Kaseya were not the work of lone hackers. They were run through a franchise model in which developers, affiliates and access brokers each specialise and split the proceeds. Understanding that economy is the key to defending against it.

By EthicalHat Research · · 3 min read
Infographic: How the ransomware economy splits the work

Three incidents defined the first half of 2021.

  • 7 May: Colonial Pipeline shut down its fuel network after a DarkSide ransomware attack and paid a ransom of about $4.4 million.
  • 30 May: JBS, the world's largest meat processor, halted plants in several countries. It later confirmed paying $11 million to REvil.
  • 2 July: REvil affiliates abused Kaseya's VSA remote management software to push ransomware to managed service providers and, through them, to up to 1,500 businesses. The group demanded $70 million for a universal decryptor.

These attacks look like the work of large criminal organisations. In fact they are run through a franchise model that has turned ransomware into an industry: ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS).

How RaaS works

In a RaaS operation, the people who write the ransomware are usually not the people who deploy it.

flowchart TB
  IAB[Initial access brokers] -->|sell access| AFF[Affiliates]
  DEV[RaaS operators / developers] -->|ransomware, leak site,<br/>payment portal| AFF
  AFF -->|intrusion, exfiltration,<br/>encryption| V[Victim]
  V -->|ransom| NEG[Negotiation portal]
  NEG --> SPLIT{Revenue split}
  SPLIT -->|~70–80%| AFF
  SPLIT -->|~20–30%| DEV
  SPLIT --> LAU[Laundering services]
  • Operators (developers) build and maintain the ransomware, the leak site, the negotiation portal and the payment infrastructure. They recruit affiliates on criminal forums, sometimes with interviews and deposits.
  • Affiliates carry out the intrusions. They pick targets, break in, escalate privileges, steal data and deploy the ransomware. In return they keep most of the ransom, typically 70–80%.
  • Initial access brokers (IABs) specialise in getting in and nothing else. They sell access to compromised networks (RDP credentials, VPN accounts, web shells, footholds from phishing) with prices that reflect the victim's size and revenue.
  • Supporting services include "bulletproof" hosting, crypting services that make malware evade antivirus, negotiators and money launderers.

DarkSide even published press releases and claimed a code of conduct. After Colonial it said it had not intended to cause "problems for society", a statement that says a lot about how much of a brand these groups have become.

Why this model is so effective

Specialisation raises quality. Developers can focus on fast encryption and evading detection. Affiliates can focus on intrusion skills. Brokers can focus on scanning and phishing at scale.

It scales horizontally. One RaaS platform can support dozens of affiliate teams attacking in parallel. Disrupting one affiliate barely dents the operation.

It survives takedowns. When DarkSide announced it was shutting down in May after the Colonial attention, and when REvil's infrastructure went dark on 13 July, their affiliates did not retire. They move to another platform, often within weeks, taking their skills and access with them.

Every weakness has a price. Because brokers sell access, an exposed RDP server or an unpatched VPN appliance is not just a risk. It is inventory, valued and listed for sale, even if nobody has attacked you yet.

Defending against an industry

The good news is that the model has dependencies, and each one is a place to break the chain.

  1. Starve the access market. Most RaaS intrusions begin with the same few weaknesses: exposed RDP, VPNs without MFA or with unpatched flaws, and phishing that drops loaders such as TrickBot, BazarLoader or IcedID. Removing those makes you a poor product for brokers to sell.
  2. Assume the affiliate is skilled. Affiliates use the same techniques as penetration testers: Cobalt Strike, credential dumping, abuse of Active Directory. Detection has to focus on behaviour, such as unusual admin tool use, new domain admins and mass file changes, rather than known malware signatures.
  3. Protect the recovery path. Affiliates are paid to find and destroy backups. Immutable and offline copies, separate backup credentials and rehearsed restores remove their leverage.
  4. Treat data theft as the main event. Almost every major RaaS group now runs a leak site. Egress monitoring and data loss controls on your most sensitive stores reduce what can be used against you.
  5. Manage your suppliers' access. Kaseya showed that a trusted management tool with privileged access to many customers is an ideal distribution channel. Know which suppliers can push code or run commands in your environment, and monitor them.

Policy is catching up

Governments are starting to treat ransomware as a national security issue. The Ransomware Task Force published nearly 50 recommendations in April. In June, the US Department of Justice recovered around $2.3 million of the Colonial ransom from a DarkSide wallet. Pressure on cryptocurrency cash-out services is increasing.

None of that removes the need for defence inside your own network. RaaS is a business that responds to profit and risk. The most useful thing any single organisation can do is make itself expensive to attack.

If you would like to know how an affiliate would move through your environment, our red teaming simulates exactly that, and our managed detection and response service watches for it around the clock.

EthicalHat Research

The EthicalHat research team: penetration testers, SOC analysts and engineers writing about security, software engineering and AI.

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